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AMERICA INVENTS, MORE OR LESS? 
 
In September 2011, President Obama signed the most significant 
patent law overhaul in decades, the America Invents Act. The central 
change of the Act is to shift patent rights from the first to invent to 
the first to file, but the act also provides immunity for claims that an 
inventor deceived the Patent Office if the invention is not patenta-
ble. Professor Petherbridge and Professor Rantanen take on these 
changes, arguing that despite the stated goal of the Act, to stimulate 
innovation and job creation in the American economy, the Act may 
well do just the opposite. In response, Professor Kesan examines 
other sections of the Act, arguing that they provide more reason to 
be optimistic, and questioning whether the reasons Professors 
Petherbridge and Rantanen are pessimistic truly can be evaluated 
without better empirical evidence.  
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OPENING STATEMENT 
The America Invents Act Jeopardizes American Innovation 
 
Jason Rantanen† & Lee Petherbridge†† 
 
All rules are distortive.  In perhaps no instance is this idea more 
true than when it comes to the patent system.  In a very fundamental 
sense, the system is nothing more than a set of rules imposed for the 
very purpose of affecting the behavior of economic actors.  Like so 
many other rules, it has a laudable purpose:  the desire to efficiently 
stimulate invention and innovation.   
The purpose of the newly enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (AIA) is to rearrange the rules of the patent system and thus to 
create a new and different set of benefit and cost possibilities for eco-
nomic actors.  See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).  Unfortunately, the changes in 
benefits and costs worked by the AIA seem tailored to do two things:  
(1) discourage the patent-driven incentive to innovate, and 
(2) protect market power.  This suggests the AIA may have a negative 
effect on American competitiveness and job creation, a disappointing 
outcome given that Congress’s express purpose in enacting the law is 
to promote technological development and protect the rights of small 
businesses and inventors. 
Assessing the impact of a substantially new legal framework for inno-
vation is, of course, a difficult and complex task and is, perhaps, ulti-
mately an empirical one.  Conceptual analyses are nonetheless important 
and possible.  Below, we consider the marginal impact of the AIA in the 
context of specific instances in which it departs from prior law. 
For over two hundred years, American patent law has given priority 
of right to those who were first in time to an invention.  The center-
piece of the AIA eviscerates this tradition, installing in its stead a gen-
eral rule under which patent rights are awarded to the “first inventor 
to file” a patent application, no matter whether he is the second, 
third, or tenth inventor.  AIA § 3, 35 U.S.C.A. § 100 (West 2011).  The 
best empirical study, which analyzed similar changes in the Canadian 
patent system and enjoys considerable theoretical support, indicates 
that such a change may discourage small inventors from inventing and 
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innovating.  See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Priority Rules:  An 
Empirical Exploration of First-to-Invent Versus First-to-File (Univ. of Pa., 
Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 11-29, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883821.  Thus, even leaving aside the de-
bate over the importance of small inventors’ contributions relative to 
those of large-firm inventors, the AIA can be expected to reduce the 
number of small inventors who invent and innovate because of patent 
law.  If, moreover, one believes that small inventors are especially im-
portant to the patent system, then the harm to innovation wrought by 
this provision is further amplified.  Finally, it must be said that by mov-
ing to disfavor small inventors, the AIA has coldly set aside the roman-
tic inspiration of the patent system and given a blow to the psychology 
of American innovation.   
Another change that carries the potential to reduce patent-
encouraged innovation is the AIA’s supplemental examination provi-
sion, which immunizes patents from charges that applicants deceived 
the Patent Office into allowing patents that do not satisfy the require-
ments for patentability.  AIA § 12, 35 U.S.C.A § 257.  Thus, in view of 
the AIA, a firm might obtain a patent containing claims it knows or 
strongly suspects are unpatentable by not providing the Patent Office 
with the facts giving rise to that knowledge or suspicion.  Such patents 
play little role in incentivizing invention, as according to the rules of 
patentability there is no “invention.”  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006).  
Nonetheless, a competitor may assert such patents against firms that 
actually invested in invention and innovation and that have dutifully 
obtained patents under the correct standards for patentability.  Even if 
an innovator is not put off from innovating by the potential of unjusti-
fiable strike suits—as some may be—the increase in low-quality patents 
encouraged by the AIA, particularly those that are directed to merely 
trivial, i.e., obvious, advances over the prior art, will make it more like-
ly that patents for very modest improvements will have to be licensed 
in order to bring products to market.  Because in such cases a license 
will divert some amount of rent from the innovator to those who hold 
patents to “improvements” that never should have issued, the incen-
tive of a patent is reduced for the innovator.  In this way, the AIA may 
make the costs of innovating exceed the expected benefits for at least 
a set of innovators who, under the old law, would have continued to 
invest in innovation.  The result is that some innovators will leave the 
patent system, perhaps ceasing to innovate altogether.   
Patent rights have traditionally encompassed infringing activity 
even if the infringing technology was independently developed and 
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even if the infringing activity started before an application for a patent 
was filed.  The AIA severely limits these ancient rules for an important 
species of patents, those directed at manufacturing and commercial 
processes, by making prior commercial use of such inventions in the 
United States a defense to patent infringement.  The AIA thus directly 
reduces the patent incentive to innovate in the field of manufacturing 
and commercial processes because it diminishes the possibility that 
those who innovate and disclose new and useful commercial processes 
will be able to recoup their investments. 
 
*      *      * 
 
The above changes to patent law, and their potential negative 
effects on innovation, are intertwined with a more fundamental 
shift underlying the AIA:  a preference for firms with greater mar-
ket power, as opposed to those who would challenge that market 
power through innovation.  
The evidence for this in the AIA is rampant.  The first-to-file provi-
sions make resources matter more than they used to when it comes to 
establishing priority to invention.  The patent laws are complicated, 
and properly navigating them to get a valuable patent can be quite 
costly.  At the margins, the AIA favors to a greater degree than the 
prior patent law those firms with more money and more skilled and 
knowledgeable lawyers.  These firms, even if they are second or third 
in time to an invention, might still win the race to the Patent Office 
simply because they can draft and file applications more quickly.  A 
firm with resources—and a large potential book of business—can get 
its patent applications drafted more quickly than a firm without them.  
Also, by reducing the patent-quality contributions of patent appli-
cants, the supplemental examination mechanism can be predicted to 
encourage a greater belief that patents are generally less likely to be 
valid than they were before.  If competitors have less respect for pa-
tents, then they can be expected to either refuse to deal or demand 
unreasonably low royalty rates more often.  Patentees, to recoup in-
vestment, may be more frequently forced to turn to litigation.  When 
they do, the litigation will be affected by how evenly matched the pa-
tentee and the alleged infringer are in terms of resources.  In particu-
lar, firms with large war chests, and with able lawyers at their 
command, should generally be expected to have a leg up on patentees 
who are substantially less resourced.   
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Prior user rights, too, advantage those with market power and dis-
advantage those seeking to compete with market power—especially 
pure inventors.  Prior user rights represent a shift away from the in-
centive mechanism of patents to encourage innovation, and toward 
the incentive mechanism of trade secret protection, especially for 
those inventions that are inherently non-self-disclosing.  Firms with 
established market power—manufacturers, for example—benefit from 
this shift because they are able to monetize such inventions directly 
through internal application.  On the other hand, firms that lack such 
market power, or pure inventors who specialize in inventing as op-
posed to manufacturing, are less able to monetize inventions through 
trade secrecy; often, they monetize the invention by licensing or sell-
ing it to an established firm, a transaction that is complicated by the 
absence of strong patent rights.  The net result is a reduced incentive 
for small-market participants and pure inventors to develop the types 
of inventions that are the subject of the AIA’s prior user rights.   
Regardless of how it is accomplished, each shift favoring market 
power represents a move away from the promotion of innovation and 
towards technological stagnancy.  Innovation is the inextricable coun-
terpoint to competition.  It both allows smaller participants in the market 
to attack market power, thus encouraging competition, and is itself en-
couraged by the existence of competition among market participants.   
The legislative determination of the AIA, however, is that market 
power is more innovative than competition.  While there is a school of 
economic thought that accepts this proposition, viz., that market pow-
er will use its excess profits to innovate, there are many who take a dif-
ferent view.  Innovation is needed to promote creative destruction—
the creation, development, and decline of firm after firm.  Firms with 
market power, however, have little to no need for innovation; indeed, 
their interest is largely in maintaining the status quo rather than dis-
turbing it through innovation.  These firms reap the greatest rewards 
if patents are weak and of low quality:  patents that can be acquired at 
a dime a dozen, and which are primarily of value in large numbers.  
Under such circumstances, even if a small participant in the market 
should invest in innovation, the firm with market power can quickly 
copy the invention, appropriating its value through the application of 
its superior resources.  The cycle of creative destruction is broken; 
stagnancy and the reduction of innovation is the portended result.  
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REBUTTAL 
The Potential to Make Progress  
Jay P. Kesan† 
 
Professors Rantanen and Petherbridge start with an instrumentalist 
view of the patent system, stating that it seeks to “stimulate invention 
and innovation.”  While the patent system may be justified on many 
grounds, for the purposes of this debate, I will assume that this is the 
main purpose of the patent system.  One key issue, then, is whether 
the America Invents Act (AIA) will stimulate invention and innova-
tion.  See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
The AIA is not what patent law scholars might create as a doctrinal 
or patent policy matter if writing on a clean slate.  In keeping with leg-
islation in general, and particularly in the intellectual property arena, 
the AIA reflects the preferences of the major stakeholders in the pa-
tent system and their bargaining power.  As such, there are aspects to 
the AIA that might be improved, and I agree with Professors Rantanen 
and Petherbridge that many of the issues they raise can only be ad-
dressed by more careful empirical work in the coming years.  But 
there are also other features of the AIA that can be solidly justified 
and that provide good reason to be optimistic about the coming years. 
I.  GRANTING PATENT RIGHTS COMMENSURATE WITH INNOVATION  
HELPS PATENTEES, PARTICULARLY SMALL INVENTORS 
 
The AIA provides new mechanisms for other people who are simi-
larly situated to the inventors and equally knowledgeable (e.g., com-
petitors, improvers, and the like) to weigh in on the decision to grant 
a patent.  Specifically, there is a new post-grant review mechanism, see 
AIA § 6, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 321–329 (West 2011); a new inter partes review 
mechanism, which modifies the previous inter partes reexamination, 
see id., 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 311–319; and a mechanism to bring prior art to 
the attention of the Patent Office together with an explanation, see id., 
35 U.S.C.A. § 301.   
These mechanisms reduce the informational asymmetry between 
the patentee and the Patent Office, and reduce the incentives for stra-
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tegic behavior by patentees who may want to take advantage of the 
constraints faced by examiners at the Patent Office.  By bringing peo-
ple with knowledge about the invention at issue into the process, the 
AIA increases the likelihood that the patent claims that are granted 
are commensurate with innovation.  Significantly, these patent validity 
challenges at the Patent Office are relatively inexpensive compared to 
litigation.  This reduction in the transactions costs of challenging issued 
patents is an important statutory innovation in the AIA.   
From the patentee’s perspective, a successful post-grant review 
provides one of the best indicators of value for all actors who may be 
interested in or affected by an issued patent.  Such an early indica-
tion of value is particularly useful for individuals, start-up companies, 
and small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs), and it will help attract 
market attention.  By way of comparison, surviving a patent opposi-
tion in Europe is considered to be one of the best indicators of eco-
nomic value in an issued patent. 
By creating opportunities to grant proven, well-defined property 
rights, the AIA improves the patent system and how it is perceived.  By 
providing mechanisms to obtain proven patent rights that are less sus-
ceptible to subsequent invalidation in court, the AIA benefits SMEs 
and start-up companies even more than large companies that have the 
resources to engage in protracted litigation.   
At the same time, having survived post-grant review, these patents 
obtained by small companies might be attractive for contingency fee 
lawyers, who may be more willing to absorb litigation costs in an effort 
to enforce these patents in court.  Relatedly, it might also be easier for 
small innovators to obtain third-party financing to enforce patents that 
have survived a post-issuance challenge in the Patent Office.  On the 
other hand, if weak patent claims are initially granted, then they may 
also be redefined, narrowed, or rejected early in the process.    
II.  SMALL INVENTORS, UNIVERSITIES, AND SMES MAY BE BENEFITTED 
 
The U.S. market share in the world market for many technology 
products and services is less than fifty percent.  See, e.g., Melly Alazraki, 
Global Pharmaceutical Sales Expected to Rise to $880 Billion in 2011, DAILY FIN. 
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/10/-07/global-
pharmaceutical-sales-expected-to-rise-to-880-billion-in.  By bringing us 
in line with the rest of the world on many fronts, including the modi-
fied first-to-file system, the AIA is good for small inventors, universities, 
SMEs, and large companies.  Small entities will benefit from learning 
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to operate in a first-to-file world and, in the process, become more 
familiar with patent systems worldwide.  This will, over time, create 
learning and experience, and will reduce some foreign transactions 
costs associated with procuring overseas patent rights.     
It is becoming increasingly true that the world market for techno-
logical goods and services is expanding more rapidly outside the Unit-
ed States.  All of the recent foreign litigation involving wireless hand-
handsets in Europe and elsewhere indicates the importance of foreign 
markets.  The pharmaceutical industry has always understood the im-
portance of overseas patent rights, and small companies and universi-
ties engaged in life science–related patenting are keen on seeking 
foreign patent rights.  The AIA facilitates foreign patenting and the 
ability to engage competitively in foreign markets by harmonizing us 
with other overseas patent systems.     
Knowing that small businesses can compete more effectively on a 
global stage under the AIA may help them become more attractive to 
angel investors, venture capitalists, and other financiers.  Foreign an-
gel investors and venture capital investment in the United States for 
start-up entities might increase as patent rules get harmonized and 
foreign markets are more accessible to small entities.  
It is not the case that small inventors were relying predominantly 
on the first-to-invent system that existed prior to the AIA.  For in-
stance, the rules of patent interference also favored large entities, such 
as the emphasis on the requirements for corroboration of all relevant 
inventive dates and the need to document diligence.  While it is at-
tractive to think of the solo, industrious, and small inventor filing a 
patent, the overwhelming majority of patent filings before the AIA 
did not involve these situations.  See Tim Lemke, Invention + Market 
Savvy = Successful Product, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at D8.  Even in 
those situations, the desire to preserve the option of foreign patent-
ing meant that even small companies and solo inventors operated 
under first-to-file rules.     
The AIA also reduces some uncertainties and creates other 
bright-line rules in significant and important ways.  For instance, in-
stead of losing an entire patent and related families of patents, 
through a possible finding of inequitable conduct, patentees can 
purge or cure these circumstances by fixing some of these errors 
through the AIA’s supplemental examination provision.  See AIA 
§ 12, 35 U.S.C.A. § 257.  At the same time, the AIA maintains a clear 
one-year grace period for filing a patent application following public 
disclosure by the patentee.  See id. § 3, 35 U.S.C.A. § 102.  This rule 
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will, of course, benefit entities such as research universities that are 
active patentees.  The AIA has also eliminated the one-year grace 
period associated with third-party sales and public uses.    
Along with the passage of the AIA, we might see other related in-
centives for small inventors to engage in foreign patenting.  The Pa-
tent Office recently conducted hearings on foreign patenting by 
small entities and on how these entities might be incentivized to 
procure valuable patent rights abroad.  See Hearing on the Study of In-
ternational Patent Protection for Small Businesses Before the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (Nov. 1, 2011) (statement of Prof. Jay P. Kesan), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/ipp-2011oct 
31-kesan-jay.pdf.  Perhaps we will see additional possibilities, such as 
using a portion of Small Business Innovation Research grants coor-
dinated by the Small Business Administration to pay for patenting 
costs in the United States and abroad.   
I am also not sure how much we can conclude from the one study 
of the Canadian patent system cited by Professors Rantanen and 
Petherbridge.  We have a more vibrant and aggressive small inventor 
community than anywhere else in the world, and it is not certain that 
we will see the same reduction in patent filings by small entities in 
the United States as was seen in Canada.  In short, we need to see 
how the AIA will play out in the coming years with respect to patent-
ing activity by small entities.  
It is also not clear how the prior user rights in manufacturing 
and commercial processes will play out.  There are other countries 
that have recognized prior user rights, but the impact of these 
rights has been poorly studied. 
 
III.  IN THE PAST, THE PATENT SYSTEM, AND INDEED, THE ENTIRE 
WORLD OF CIVIL LITIGATION FAVORS LARGE COMPANIES WITH  
MORE RESOURCES, AND THE AIA CANNOT CHANGE THAT 
 
Large companies can always impose costs on small company liti-
gants and drag out litigation.  Our discovery and motion practice sys-
tem, together with the new emphasis on e-discovery, ensures that this 
is likely to be the case for the foreseeable future.   
The threshold requirements for initiating a post-grant review 
and/or the inter partes review under the AIA are stringent, and the 
estoppel provisions in both situations are significant.  This reduces the 
likelihood that these mechanisms will be used to simply delay and 
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harass patentees, and to impose unnecessary costs on patentees who 
are small companies.   
There is much to be done empirically as the AIA—the most signifi-
cant patent reform in fifty-nine years—goes into effect.  The patent 
system is a two-stage bargain involving the Patent Office in the first 
stage and the federal courts in the second stage.  Shifting the empha-
sis to the Patent Office, particularly with respect to matters of patent 
validity, has the possibility of changing the overall patent system, as we 
know it, very significantly.  Specifically, the possible shift in patent va-
lidity challenges to administrative mechanisms in the Patent Office, 
instead of resorting just to the courts, holds the possibility of reducing 
litigation costs.  But we have to wait and see how this plays out. 
It is certainly the case that large companies can and do file more pa-
tents, and have the resources to do so.  But the new reduced fees for mi-
cro entities help some small companies and inventors.  See, e.g., AIA § 10, 
35 U.S.C.A. § 123.  The creation of the micro-entity status particularly 
helps universities that have been engines of innovation, creating entirely 
new market segments and new industries with their pioneering work. 
As mentioned above, patents that survive post-grant review might al-
so be very attractive for enforcement in court through contingency fee 
representation, a situation that would clearly benefit small inventors. 
 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF THE AIA ON BOTH SMALL AND LARGE  
COMPANIES IS SIGNIFICANT, BUT THE TRAJECTORY OF  
THESECHANGES IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT 
   
There are too many moving parts in the AIA to predict winners 
and losers in patent litigation.  At the outset, patentees and alleged 
infringers/patent challengers are not worlds apart in the patent sys-
tem, as labor and management are.  The same entity may be both a 
patentee and an alleged infringer in different lawsuits.   
The AIA offers new possibilities for both patentees and patent in-
fringers/challengers.  Patentees may benefit from new provisions that:  
permit supplemental examination to correct inadvertent or other 
errors in patent prosecution, see id. § 12, 35 U.S.C.A. § 257; increase 
the standard for Patent Office review in inter partes review proceed-
ings, together with an estoppel effect, see id. § 6, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 311–
319; eliminate best mode–related counterclaims in litigation, see id. 
§ 15, 35 U.S.C.A. § 282; and restrict false patent marking claims, see 
id. § 16, 35 U.S.C.A. § 292.   
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Alleged infringers and patent challengers may benefit from new 
provisions that:  limit joinder of multiple defendants in a single law-
suit, see id. § 19, 35 U.S.C.A. § 299; provide mechanisms to submit pri-
or art for pending patent applications, see id. § 6, 35 U.S.C.A. § 301; 
create new mechanisms for challenging issued patents in the Patent 
Office, see id., 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 311–329; create an expanded, new de-
fense of prior commercial use, see id. § 5, 35 U.S.C.A. § 273; and limit 
the evidence that may be relied on for proving willful infringement, 
see id. § 17, 35 U.S.C.A. § 298.  
With so many significant changes being introduced, it is difficult to 
abstract away and predict the impact of the AIA on either small or 
large companies and on patentees or alleged infringers. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
The America Invents Act Jeopardizes American Innovation  
 
Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge† 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Rebuttal, Professor Kesan takes the overarching position that 
the relationship between the existing patent system and the new pa-
tent law is so complicated that a conceptual analysis centered on eco-
nomic instrumentalism is not really worth the candle.  Besides 
providing a remarkably tepid defense of the merits of the America 
Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be cod-
ified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), that position—if correct—
undercuts a substantial part of forty or more years’ worth of legal and 
economic scholarship directed to patent law and policy.   
Perhaps our conclusion might be different if Congress applied a 
different form of reasoning to justify its new law, or if it thought the 
AIA’s effect would be uncertain.  Yet, the sense of Congress in enact-
ing the AIA is decidedly instrumentalist:  “[T]he patent system should 
promote industries to continue to develop new technologies that spur 
growth and create jobs across the country which includes protecting 
the rights of small businesses and inventors from predatory behavior 
that could result in the cutting off of innovation.”  Id. § 30, 125 Stat. at 
339.  Nor is there any evidence in the AIA that Congress is concerned 
that, with “so many significant changes being introduced,” it would be 
“difficult to abstract away and predict the impact of the AIA on either 
small or large companies and on patentees or alleged infringers.”  Ra-
ther, Congress apparently thinks that the AIA will have an innovation 
and job-creating effect, and that the rights of small businesses and in-
ventors will be protected from predatory behavior that could cause 
them to cease innovating.  Using the tools and premises Congress it-
self used to justify the AIA is, we think, more than appropriate.   
Nor do we think the fact that the AIA introduces many changes to 
the patent law forecloses the form of analysis used in this debate.  In-
deed, we think this form is particularly important given Professor 
 
† This brings to an end our response to Professor Kesan, and closes our contribu-
tion to this debate.  We thus take this opportunity to thank Professor Kesan and the 
editors at PENNumbra for working so diligently to bring the public this early assessment 
of the America Invents Act.   
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Kesan’s explanation that the AIA reflects “the preferences of the ma-
jor stakeholders in the patent system and their bargaining power.”  If 
on balance the underlying premise of the AIA is predominantly public 
choice, and not public interest, then perhaps we should not be overly 
surprised to find it favors corporate interests with substantial market 
power.  Nor should we be particularly surprised to find provisions that 
offer little more than lip service to the interests that are likely to be 
trampled by the legislation.  See, e.g., id. § 28, 125 Stat. at 339 (establish-
ing an ombudsman program for small business concerns); id. § 31, 125 
Stat. at 339-40 (requiring a study on international patent protection for 
small businesses); see also id. § 10, 35 U.S.C.A. 123 (West 2011) (estab-
lishing a micro-entity fee status).  To be clear, a public choice–defined 
AIA is not flawed per se.  But given that the fundamental policy underly-
ing the patent law itself is decidedly public interest, a public choice de-
fined–AIA deserves serious scrutiny.  And a good place to start is with 
those provisions that are at the core of the legislation and that appear to 
have the most substantial systematic consequences.   
 
*      *      * 
 
In our Opening Statement, we relied on core provisions of the AIA 
to argue that what Congress enacted seems well tailored to do two 
things:  (1) discourage the patent-given incentive to innovate and (2) 
protect market power.  Both would seem to jeopardize more than help 
American innovation and job creation.  And neither would seem to 
protect, any more than the pre-AIA patent law, the ability of small 
businesses and small inventors to compete in the marketplace.   
Professor Kesan resists our argument by pointing to the post-grant 
review and supplemental examination provisions, suggesting that such 
provisions should result in a higher level of patent quality, and thus 
benefit patentees—particularly small inventors.  But it is unlikely that 
the post-grant review provisions will have any serious impact on patent 
quality.  Worse, there is good reason to think that these provisions will 
harm rather than benefit the inventors and small businesses about 
which Professor Kesan is concerned.  
I.  POST-GRANT REVIEW AND PATENT QUALITY 
The legal determination of primary importance to most patents’ 
economic significance is the one the Patent Office makes when it de-
cides to allow the patent to issue.  Conventional estimates hold that 
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about only one percent of patents are litigated,1, while the number of 
patents for which reexamination has been requested is even smaller.2  
In contrast, the percentage of issued patents that are licensed might 
range from roughly five to twenty-nine percent depending on the cir-
cumstances,3 while as many as fifty percent of patents may be com-
mercialized in a broader sense.4  These patent system metrics suggest 
that the overwhelming majority of patents that are monetized, are 
capable of being monetized, or have a monetizing effect by deterring 
competition and improving the pricing position of the patentee are 
not litigated patents or post-grant reviewed patents.  They are, in-
stead, regular old issued patents.  
As post-grant review provisions are not directed to the decision to 
issue a patent in the first instance, they will likely have little impact on 
patent quality as a whole.  Notably, Professor Kesan makes no claim 
that the AIA’s post-grant review provisions will somehow encourage pa-
tent applicants to take on the cost of improving the quality of the Patent 
Office’s decision to issue a patent in the first instance.  Even assuming, 
therefore, that post-grant review produces a marginal improvement in 
the quality of a patent subjected to it, the process will affect only the 
reviewed patent, not the quality of issued patents as a whole.   
Moreover, such second-review patents should be rare for the rea-
sons Professor Kesan himself points out.  Access to the more rigorous 
forms of the procedure comes with stringent threshold requirements 
and estoppel provisions.  The pre-AIA law had similarly limited post-
grant review provisions, and experience has shown that they are not 
likely to be used much.  After all, what potential infringement defend-
 
1 See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition:  Policy Innovation and the 
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 548 (2000). 
2 See Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report_Sept_2011.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 
2012) (reporting that 780 ex parte reexamination requests were filed in 2010); Inter 
Partes Reexamination Filing Data, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF., http://www. 
uspto.gov/patents/IP_quarterly_report_September_2011.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 
2012) (reporting that 281 inter partes reexamination requests were filed in 2010); see 
also U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2010, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2012) (reporting that the Patent Office issued 219,614 utility patents in 2010). 
3 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1507 (2001); Eugen Mattes et al., Surveying Inventors Listed on Patents to Investigate 
Determinants of Innovation, 69 SCIENTOMETRICS 475, 484 tbl.4. (2006); Kazuyuki Moto-
hashi, Licensing or Not Licensing?  An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Patents by 
Japanese Firms, 37 RES. POL’Y 1548, 1551 tbl.1 (2008). 
4 See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362-63 & 
n.121 (2010). 
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ant wants to spend its litigation defenses at the Patent Office—an 
agency that is subject to well-recognized externalities that favor sus-
taining patent claims—when it can preserve those defenses for presen-
tation to a judicial decisionmaker who is likely to be much more chary 
about ruling in favor of the patent holder?  In short, using post-grant 
review to snipe the occasional patent, or adding a few “gold plated” 
patents to the patent system, is not cause to believe that the quality of 
most, or even many, patents will be improved.  Nor is it cause to be-
lieve that the AIA will produce patents that behave any more like 
“property” than patents have before.    
That is the relatively small upside.  The downside—especially for 
small businesses and inventors—may be much greater.  One of the 
central policy purposes of post-grant review mechanisms, especially 
ones that empower potential infringers, is to make patent enforce-
ment more arduous, expensive, and difficult for most patentees.  After 
the AIA, a patentee is more likely to have to endure a second patent 
examination before it can monetize an issued patent.  For many small 
businesses and inventors, a second patent examination may be one 
patent examination too many.  Due to mismatched resources and the 
ever-present possibility of Patent Office error, deserving inventors 
might suffer an adverse decision on the second patent examination.  
And some small businesses and inventors may simply not—perhaps 
due to limited resources—be able to afford to wait to have a patent 
examined twice before being able to enforce it.  Thus, while it may be 
true that some small fraction of small businesses and inventors bene-
fit from the “gold plating” offered by post-grant review provisions, it 
is quite probable that for many small businesses and inventors, post-
grant review provisions will operate more as a patent system–use tax, 
adding to the cost and complexity of obtaining an enforceable pa-
tent.  If so, perhaps the main consequence of the provisions will be 
to provide those with market power better means to clip the wings of 
up-and-coming competitors and to appropriate the value of their 
innovations.  If so, the provisions will reduce, rather than promote, 
the small business and inventor participation that Professor Kesan 
emphasizes to support the AIA.   
Underlying these expected effects is the concern that the AIA car-
ries the potential to push down patent quality.  In his Rebuttal, Profes-
sor Kesan suggests that the post-grant review mechanisms in the AIA 
operate to shift decisionmaking about patent validity away from the 
courts and to the Patent Office.  We identify a different shift, however:  
a move away from serious decisionmaking about patent validity during 
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the initial examination of a patent and to various forms of post-grant 
examination.  In this light, we are skeptical of the argument that these 
mechanisms will improve the quality of issued patents, i.e., the patents 
that matter in most instances.  This concern is especially strong when 
it comes to the AIA’s supplemental examination provisions, which are 
likely to have a much greater systemic—and deleterious—effect on 
patent quality.  See AIA § 12, 35 U.S.C.A. § 257. 
In explaining this point, we will not here dispute Professor Kesan’s 
contention that the AIA clarifies the law around inequitable conduct, 
but will instead focus on where our views diverge from his on whether 
this is necessarily a good thing.  The supplemental examination provi-
sions create a patent amnesty program.  See Jason Rantanen & Lee 
Petherbridge, Commentary, Toward a System of Invention Registration:  
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRES-
SIONS 24, 25 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/ 
rantanenpetherbridge.pdf.  They permit applicants to obtain patents 
despite conduct that would be abhorrent under traditional understand-
ings of a patent applicant’s obligation to be equitable in dealing with 
the public and with competitors, and permit them, as Representative 
Henry Waxman put it, to play a “get out of jail free card” if strategy dic-
tates.  157 CONG. REC. E1208 (daily ed. June 24, 2011) (statement of 
Rep. Henry A. Waxman).  The “card” is a supplemental examination 
request, and assuming it is played properly, most patent applicants 
should have the opportunity to immunize all but the most egregious 
misconduct before a competitor ever has an opportunity to learn of it.   
The supplemental examination provisions of the AIA will not help 
patents work more like property.  As we have explained elsewhere, the 
AIA’s supplemental examination provisions reduce marginal appli-
cants’ incentives to take on the costs of patent quality, and increase 
such applicants’ incentives to place more of the costs of patent quality 
on the Patent Office, competitors, and the public.  See Rantanen & 
Petherbridge, supra, at 30-31.  The AIA thus encourages informational 
asymmetry that is likely to reduce the quality of the Patent Office’s 
decisionmaking on the point of whether to issue a patent.  An increase 
in low-quality patents will encourage the belief that the marginal pa-
tent is less likely than before to be valid.  A greater systemic belief that 
patents are not likely to be valid can be expected to encourage litiga-
tion, as opposed to licensing, and to raise the cost of patent monetiza-
tion and enforcement.  The more costly patent enforcement is made 
to be, the more likely market power is favored.   
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In this post-AIA world, occasionally relevant post-grant review pro-
cedures have almost no power to stem the impact of the supplemental 
examination provisions, which can be expected to affect a much 
broader body of patents.  The firms that should be expected to suc-
ceed in this environment are those with greater market power:  those 
that can pay the cost of enforcement and those with the resources to 
acquire large numbers of low-quality patents.  They are likely to be 
neither small businesses and small inventors nor, as Professor Kesan 
suggests, universities, as they lack unlimited budgets for patent acqui-
sition and enforcement.   
II.  THE AIA AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION 
Professor Kesan offers a second justification for the AIA:  small 
businesses, inventors, and universities should all benefit from the AIA 
because it brings “us in line with the rest of the world on many fronts” 
and will teach such inventors how “to operate in a first-to-file world.”  
It is hard to see how the AIA works the claimed benefit.     
At the outset, while we are prepared to assume for the purpose of 
this response that a first-to-file system is superior to a first-to-invent 
system in terms of how well it induces invention and innovation, as we 
commented in our Opening Statement, we think that there are merits 
to the existing first-to-invent system and that such a choice could itself 
be the subject of a serious debate. 
With that assumption in mind, however, two key questions arise.  
First, does the move to the AIA’s first-to-file regime offer small busi-
nesses, inventors, and universities anything they did not have before?  
And, second, do any such benefits adequately compensate these entities 
for patents that they can no longer obtain and enforce in the United 
States because of the post-grant review and supplemental examination 
mechanisms?  The answer to both questions is likely to be no.  
However the issue is sliced, the most relevant rent-seeking adminis-
trative costs for most U.S. inventors that will use a patent system are 
the costs of U.S. patents, not the costs of foreign patents.  Small inno-
vators would love to have access to a market share that is, as Professor 
Kesan explains, nearly fifty percent of the world market simply by fil-
ing a patent application for a single country.  Indeed, most foreign 
markets do not approach the U.S. market in terms of economic sig-
nificance, and much foreign patenting probably represents dimin-
ished marginal returns for innovators.  Put simply, it is the logistical, 
regulatory, and other costs associated with doing business in a for-
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eign country, relative to smaller patent-driven returns, that are likely 
the main reasons why small businesses and inventors do not seek 
large numbers of foreign patents.  It is not a lack of international 
harmonization of the rules of priority.   
Still, if the installation of a first-to-file system in the United States 
truly harmonized patent acquisition requirements in a way that re-
duced the cost and complexity of foreign patenting, then perhaps 
Professor Kesan’s argument might have better purchase.  But before 
the AIA, small businesses, inventors, and universities already knew that 
they needed to be first to file “to preserve the option of foreign pa-
tenting.”  The AIA does nothing to change this.  More importantly, 
the AIA has not harmonized U.S. patentability rules with those of for-
eign nations, even when it comes to the first-to-file provisions.  The 
AIA-imposed system is not a first-to-file system like that used in other 
parts of the world.  It is more technically a first-to-file or first-to-
publicly-disclose system.  In addition, the AIA first-to-file system comes 
with a grace period of up to one year depending on the applicant’s 
own disclosure.  See AIA § 3, 35 U.S.C.A. § 102.  The European first-to-
file system does not have the public disclosure provisions and does not 
include a parallel grace period.  See European Patent Convention art. 
55, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268.  Thus, a U.S. inventor who discloses 
under the American first-to-file system, thinking that it creates a safe 
harbor with respect to validity, may have just eliminated his or her 
ability to obtain a patent abroad.  Sophisticated entities have long had 
no difficulty operating in a system where U.S. priority law differs from 
that of other countries, and they will likely remain capable of navi-
gating foreign systems.  Small inventors, however, should be no less 
prone to making errors fatal to foreign patentability than they were 
before the enactment of the AIA, especially if the AIA is marketed as 
having “harmonized” U.S. and foreign patent law.   
Even if one were to overlook the fact that the AIA does not really 
harmonize much U.S. and foreign priority law, the practical reality for 
those who would seek foreign patents after the AIA is little different 
than it was before.  This is so because other substantive differences still 
remain between U.S. patent law and the various national patent laws of 
the myriad foreign jurisdictions in which U.S. inventors might desire to 
patent.  See, e.g., id. art. 52-57 (showing some of the different patentabil-
ity requirements in Europe).  At bottom, the AIA thus does next to 
nothing in terms of “harmonization” that facilitates foreign patenting 
for small businesses, inventors, and universities.  If U.S. inventors want 
quality overseas patent protection, then they will still face high adminis-
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trative costs, and will likely still have to pay substantial legal fees to spe-
cialized counsel knowledgeable about a specific country’s patent laws.   
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
Not Yet Time for a Verdict 
 
Jay P. Kesan† 
I.  THE AIA, INNOVATION, AND PATENT QUALITY 
It is premature to conclude that the America Invents Act (AIA) will 
hurt innovation.  The aspirations of the AIA are well founded and well 
supported by sound economic theory.  The AIA seeks to grant patent 
rights truly commensurate with the underlying innovation, rights that 
can withstand scrutiny by those knowledgeable in the relevant tech-
nology.  This scrutiny can be obtained cheaply, unlike through costly 
litigation, and in the process, the AIA provides clear and early indi-
cations of patent value that can facilitate patent transactions.  In 
other words, the AIA seeks to further innovation by granting well-
defined property rights, while minimizing the deleterious effects of 
overbroad property rights; reducing transactions costs; minimizing 
strategic and opportunistic behavior that capitalizes on the high cost 
of patent invalidation; and facilitating market transactions based on 
tested indications of value.   
The details in the AIA are encouraging and will help foster innova-
tion by granting meaningful patent rights.  For example, the one-year 
time limit to conclude post-grant review, see AIA § 3, 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 
(West 2011), the use of administrative patent judges, see id. § 7, 35 
U.S.C.A. § 6, the possibility of discovery, see id. § 6, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 316, 
326, and the stay in the district court proceedings, see id., 35 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 315, 325, are examples of details in the post-grant review process 
that are helpful in making this process both timely and effective.    
While the AIA can be justified by sound economic thinking, the de-
tails of the Patent Office’s implementation of the AIA are important.  
Some of the benefits of the AIA can be reduced by ineffective imple-
mentation, and the patent community eagerly awaits the new Patent 
Office rules.  It is imperative that we have an effective, low-cost post-
grant review process that can be concluded in a timely fashion.  A timely 
process with low transaction costs for challenging the validity of patent 
 
 † I want to thank both Professor Rantanen and Professor Petherbridge for a 
lively and stimulating exchange of ideas on the current state of the AIA.  I would also 
like to thank the editors at PENNumbra for their hard work and diligent efforts to 
make this debate possible. 
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claims is critical.  If the post-grant review process is bogged down by ex-
tensive discovery and lasts as long as current inter partes reexamina-
tions, then the benefits of this process will be undermined.  In this 
respect, it is too early to tell how the AIA will unfold.  In coming years, it 
may also be that some aspects of the AIA, such as the estoppel effect in 
post-grant and inter partes review, may have to be revisited and 
tweaked, but the overall approach is sound.   
There are good reasons to conclude that post-grant review and in-
ter partes review will improve patent quality.  As the costs of mounting 
a patent challenge are reduced significantly and the process is con-
cluded within a year of its initiation, it stands to reason that the per-
centage of issued patents that will be challenged will increase.  It is 
meaningless to look at the numbers associated with the current inter 
partes reexamination process, which takes several years—currently 
more than thirty-six months—to bring to conclusion, or to look at the 
enormously expensive patent litigation system in the courts today.  See 
Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto. 
gov/patents/IP_quarterly_report_September_2011.pdf (last visited Jan. 
2, 2012).  This system, which did not have an effective low-cost mecha-
nism to challenge patents, should now be in the past.  It is more 
meaningful to look at the percentage of issued patents that are op-
posed in Europe, which stands around five percent.   
Looking at the gross number of issued patents that are litigated or 
licensed can be misleading in another respect.  It is the percentage of 
valuable patents (i.e., patents that are or likely to be embodied in 
goods and services), and not the total number of issued patents, that 
can be challenged under post-grant review that is significant.  If five to 
twenty-nine percent of issued patents are licensed, as indicated by Pro-
fessors Rantanen and Petherbridge, and if five percent of issued pa-
tents are subject to post-grant review since these patents are viewed as 
significant by competitors, then the AIA has succeeded in ensuring 
that licensees have an effective challenge mechanism to ensure that a 
very large percentage of patent rights, which may very well be the sub-
ject of future licenses, are carefully evaluated post-issuance.    
Moreover, the knowledge that it is increasingly likely that one’s pa-
tent rights may be challenged can have important strategic benefits 
and promote positive modifications in filing behavior.  Low-cost pa-
tent challenges can change the calculus.  Patentees will not be incen-
tivized to seek overbroad patent rights aggressively at the outset.  
Instead, patentees are more likely to present claims that can be issued 
through normal prosecution and also to withstand a post-grant chal-
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lenge, if one is mounted.  In addition, by obtaining issued patent 
claims that are seen as likely to withstand a challenge, patentees en-
sure that they will be able to attract financial resources to fight po-
tential challengers.  Finally, once the patent validity issues are 
contested and resolved in a cost-effective manner in the Patent Of-
fice, the parties are left with only the issues of infringement and 
remedies in court, creating the possibility of a cheaper and quicker 
resolution of the dispute.       
One related point with respect to the political economy of the pa-
tent system and the passage of the AIA:  there is compelling work from 
scholars such as Professor Jessica Litman showing that copyright legis-
lation reflects the preferences of significant and powerful stakeholders 
in this intellectual property system.  See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIG-
ITAL COPYRIGHT 192 (2001).  While the stakeholders in the patent 
system may be different from those in the copyright world, patent leg-
islation is not an exception in this regard.  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & An-
dres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1341, 1376-90 (2009) (demonstrating this point empirically).  That 
said, there is no evidence that the public interest is being “trampled” 
or offered “little more than lip service” by the AIA.  On the contrary, 
it is in the interest of the general public not to have overbroad pa-
tent rights since the costs associated with such rights are passed on 
and ultimately borne by consumers and the general public.  As an-
other example, universities, a group that is regarded as having lower 
bargaining power, have benefited from both the AIA’s modified first-
to-file system that preserves priority for first public disclosure and 
the significant reduction in patent fees.               
II.  SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION IN THE  
AIA AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
The law of inequitable conduct was changed by the Federal Cir-
cuit’s decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011), which was decided a few months before the 
passage of the AIA.  By significantly raising the legal standards for 
both materiality and intent, Therasense made it very difficult for patent 
defendants to mount a successful inequitable conduct counterclaim.  
Id. at 1290-91.  When considered in light of the Therasense decision, 
the supplemental examination provisions in the AIA merely provide 
an additional mechanism to attempt to purge the likelihood of inequi-
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table conduct assertions in the small number of cases in which that 
assurance and opportunity is helpful.   
The supplemental examination provisions are likely to benefit 
small companies with fewer resources to devote to patent prosecution, 
which previously were more likely to make inadvertent mistakes in the 
course of prosecution that could be seized upon by a defendant in 
subsequent litigation.  Eli Lilly’s patent counsel recently pointed out 
that the supplemental examination mechanism in the AIA would be 
very helpful in situations with entrepreneurial entities.  See Douglas 
Norman, Esq., Chief Patent Counsel, Eli Lilly & Co., Remarks at the 
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Symposium, 
The America Invents Act:  Patent Law’s New Lease on Life (Dec. 2, 
2011).  In the past, when smaller companies had very valuable patent-
ed technologies (such as a significant molecule) but were disadvan-
taged by events in the course of patent prosecution (such as the 
inadvertent omission of relevant but ultimately distinguishable prior 
art), they had no recourse when larger companies refused to bear the 
risk of investing in a technology that ultimately could be found unen-
forceable.  Now, under the supplemental examination provisions in 
the AIA, the larger company may be willing to file a request for sup-
plemental examination to purge the basis for any future inequitable 
conduct challenge and then to license the patented technology.      
Professors Rantanen and Petherbridge’s arguments that the sup-
plemental examination provisions encourage informational asym-
metry and will cause a reduction in patent quality are not persuasive.  
It is certainly well established that, given the Patent Office’s examina-
tion constraints, there is an informational asymmetry between patent-
ees and the Patent Office that can then reduce the overall quality of 
issued patents.  The AIA takes the approach that this informational 
asymmetry can be reduced most efficiently by bringing well-informed 
actors into the patent examination process who can provide the Pa-
tent Office with directly applicable knowledge about the prior art with 
respect to the specific claims at issue.  Under the AIA, patentees know 
that if competitors consider their issued patent claims valuable, then 
these claims will be challenged in the Patent Office.  It is then irrational 
for patentees simply to file patent claims of poor quality and incur the 
additional costs of a post-issuance challenge that will be successful for 
the challenger.  In short, the post-grant and inter partes review mecha-
nisms in the AIA have the potential to increase patent quality signifi-
cantly, particularly with respect to the most valuable patents. 
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III.  THE AIA AND INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION 
Professors Rantanen and Petherbridge assert that “most foreign 
markets do not approach the U.S. market in terms of economic signif-
icance.”  In fact, the size of the international (i.e., non-U.S.) market for 
products such as pharmaceuticals, wireless handsets, and smartphones, 
which embody multiple patented technologies, is much larger than the 
U.S. market.  The major technology companies in the computer and 
communication sector and the pharmaceutical and life science sectors 
have recognized that for a long time.  As an example, consider the ex-
tensive amount of patent litigation in various European countries relat-
ed to wireless handsets and smartphones in the past two years.  See, e.g., 
Apple Seeks Ban On All Galaxy Smartphones, Tablets in EU, COMPUTER-
WORLD (Aug. 18, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/ 
s/article/9219292/Apple_seeks_ban_on_all_Galaxy_smartphones_table
ts_in_EU?taxonomyId=144.  The small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in the United States are now realizing their ability to compete and 
profit in international markets.    
By bringing the U.S. patent system and its prior art rules closer to a 
first-to-file system, the AIA is clearer and simpler for small businesses 
that wish to seek international patent protection.  The AIA incentiviz-
es and empowers a change in patent filing strategy that is easier to 
reconcile with that of other countries and that will also provide valua-
ble learning for patentees.  In the process, American companies, par-
ticularly SMEs, can make their technologies more valuable and 
attractive to potential buyers and licensees by obtaining exclusive 
rights for their innovations in international markets.      
Of course, the AIA cannot solve all problems in foreign countries 
and markets.  There may well be additional regulatory and logistical 
costs in some countries, but there will be many short-term and long-
term opportunities as well, especially in the developed and rapidly 
developing countries.  Professors Rantanen and Petherbridge suggest 
that if the AIA cannot solve all international patent harmonization 
problems and open up international markets, then the AIA should do 
nothing.  Sustained, incremental progress, particularly in the interna-
tional context, can prove to be important.  With the passage of time, 
the AIA is very likely to be seen as a foundational step in the process of 
patent harmonization, opening up patent protection for America’s 
innovative companies in foreign markets. 
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